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ON REUSING EPHEMERAL KEYS IN DIFFIE-HELLMAN
KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOLS
ALFRED MENEZES AND BERKANT USTAOGLU
Abstract. A party may choose to reuse ephemeral public keys in a
Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol in order to reduce its compu-
tational workload or to mitigate against denial-of-service attacks. In
this note we highlight the danger of reusing ephemeral keys if domain
parameters are not appropriately selected or if public keys are not ap-
propriately validated.
1. Introduction
Let G be a multiplicatively-written group of prime order q, and let g
be a generator of G. In the classic Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol,
two parties ˆ A and ˆ B exchange public keys X = gx and Y = gy, where
x ∈R [1,q − 1] and y ∈R [1,q − 1] are their respective private keys, and
thereafter compute the shared secret σ = Xy = Y x = gxy. A session key is
then derived from σ, usually by hashing.
A public key may either be static (long-lived) or ephemeral (short-lived).
Ephemeral public keys are unauthenticated, whereas static public keys are
authenticated by inclusion in certiﬁcates issued by a certiﬁcation author-
ity. The Diﬃe-Hellman protocol is called static-static if both X and Y are
static; this protocol has the drawback that the shared secret σ is ﬁxed for
the lifetime of the static keys. The downside of the ephemeral-ephemeral
Diﬃe-Hellman protocol, in which both X and Y are ephemeral, is that
σ is unauthenticated. However, the ephemeral-ephemeral protocol is ap-
pealing because it achieves perfect forward secrecy — the leakage of any
long-term secret keys does not give an attacker any advantage in learning
session keys that were previously established. Another Diﬃe-Hellman vari-
ant is ephemeral-static where the initiator’s public key is ephemeral and
the responder’s public key is static; this variant is useful in situations like
email where the recipient may not be online and therefore cannot con-
tribute an ephemeral public key. Many Diﬃe-Hellman protocols have also
been proposed in which the communicating parties exchange both static and
ephemeral public keys which are then combined to yield an authenticated
session key; for example, see [19, 17, 14].
Some Diﬃe-Hellman protocols implicitly or explicitly require that an
ephemeral key pair can be used in only one session. For example, the
ANSI X9.42 [2] standard which speciﬁes several Diﬃe-Hellman protocols
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states that an ephemeral key is a “private or public key that is unique for
each execution of a cryptographic scheme. An ephemeral private key is to be
destroyed as soon as computational need for it is complete.” Other protocols
do not place any restrictions on the reuse of ephemeral keys. For example,
the SIGMA protocol [13], which is the basis for the signature-based modes
of the IKE (versions 1 and 2) protocols, allows for the reuse of an ephemeral
public key “by the same party across diﬀerent sessions”, and this advice is
followed in the IKEv2 standard [12, Section 2.12].
The primary reason for reusing ephemeral public keys is to increase eﬃ-
ciency by reducing the number of costly exponentiations a party has to per-
form. Another reason is to mitigate against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
For example the JFKi protocol [1] allows a responder to reuse an ephemeral
public key, whereby the responder does not have to do any expensive com-
putations in its ﬁrst response and only performs costly exponentiations after
receiving the second message from the session’s initiator. Since the initiator
has to perform costly cryptographic operations when preparing the second
message, this protocol oﬀers the responder some resistance to DoS attacks.
The authors of [1] go on to say that it is inadvisable not to reuse ephemeral
public keys “in times of high load (or attack).”
In this paper we examine the vulnerability of some standardized Diﬃe-
Hellman protocols to ‘small-subgroup attacks’ in the case where ephemeral
keys are reused but public keys are not validated as being non-identity ele-
ments in the group G. A brief overview of small-subgroup attacks is given in
§2. In §3 we show that in some scenarios the ephemeral-static Diﬃe-Hellman
protocol in S/MIME is vulnerable to such attacks. In §4 we consider the
version of the HMQV protocol that has been proposed for standardization
by IEEE P1363. We conclude with some remarks in §5.
2. Small-subgroup attacks
Lim and Lee [18] showed that some discrete logarithm protocols may be
vulnerable to small-subgroup attacks if the recipient of a public key does
not validate it, i.e., verify that the public key is an element of the group
G =  g  and is not equal to 1. In this section we describe a well-known
small-subgroup attack on the static-static Diﬃe-Hellman protocol whereby
parties ˆ A and ˆ B exchange their static public keys A = ga and B = gb, and
thereafter compute a session key K = H(σ) where σ = Ab = Ba = gab and
H is a hash function.
Let G′ be a group such that:
(1) The elements of G′ are represented in the same format as elements
of G (e.g., bitstrings of the same length).
(2) A conventional implementation of the multiplication operation for
elements of G can also be used to multiply elements of G′.
(3) G′ has an element γ of order t, where t is small enough so that an
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Suppose that neither ˆ A nor the certiﬁcation authority verify that static
public keys are non-identity elements of G. The attacker, party ˆ B, selects
an invalid static public key B = γ. Upon receiving B, party ˆ A computes
K = H(σ) where σ = Ba = γa. Suppose now that ˆ A subsequently sends ˆ B
an authenticated message (m,T) where T = MACK(m). Then ˆ B iteratively
computes K′ = H(γc) and T′ = MACK′(m) for c = 0,1,2,... until T′ =
T, in which case c = a mod t with high probability. By repeating this
procedure for several orders t that are pairwise relatively prime (and possibly
diﬀerent groups G′), ˆ B can eﬃciently determine ˆ A’s static private key a by
the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
We next consider the applicability of such small-subgroup attacks in three
groups that are widely used in practice.
2.1. DSA groups. As in DSA, G is the subgroup of prime order q of the
multiplicative group G′ of a prime ﬁeld Zp. The bitlength of q is substantially
smaller than that of p. For example, the bitlengths of q and p may be 160 and
1024 respectively, or 256 and 3072 respectively. Since the group parameters
are typically generated by randomly selecting a prime q, and then randomly
selecting even integers k of the appropriate bitlength until p = 1+kq is prime,
one can expect with non-negligible probability (see [4]) that (p − 1)/q will
have a smooth divisor greater than q. Hence DSA groups are vulnerable to
small-subgroup attacks if the recipient of a public key B does not verify that
B ∈ G\{0,1}; this validation can be accomplished by checking that B is an
integer in the interval [2,p − 1] and that Bq = 1. Another countermeasure
against these attacks is to select domain parameters p and q so that (p−1)/q
does not have any small prime factors.
2.2. Safe prime groups. In these groups, G is the subgroup of prime order
q of the multiplicative group of a prime ﬁeld Zp, where p = 2q + 1. If ˆ A
checks that the public key B is an integer in the interval [2,p−2] then, since
the multiplicative group of Zp has order 2q, attacks like the ones described
above can reveal at most a single bit of a. Thus small-subgroup attacks are
not eﬀective in the case of safe prime groups.
2.3. Elliptic curve groups. Let E : V 2 = U3+αU +β be an elliptic curve
of prime order q deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld Fp, and let G = E(Fp). In [5]
(see also [3]) it was observed that the usual formulae for adding points in
E(Fp) do not explicitly depend on the coeﬃcient β. Hence ˆ B could launch
the small-subgroup attack described above by selecting B ∈ G′ = E′(Fp),
where E′ : V 2 = U3+αU +β′ is an elliptic curve whose order is divisible by
a relatively small prime factor t. ˆ A can easily thwart the attack by checking
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3. S/MIME
S/MIME (version 3.1) is an IETF standard for securing email [20, 11, 10].
S/MIME can be used to provide several security services including conﬁ-
dentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication, and non-repudiation,
and allows the use of various public-key cryptographic algorithms including
RSA, DSA and Diﬃe-Hellman. In this section we examine the vulnera-
bility to small-subgroup attacks of an encryption-only mode in S/MIME
(called “Enveloped-only” in [20]) when ephemeral-static Diﬃe-Hellman (as
described in [21]) is used for key agreement.
We ﬁrst give a description of the S/MIME encryption-only mode. Let
G =  g  be a DSA subgroup, i.e., G is a subgroup of order q of G′ = Z∗
p,
where the bitlength of q is substantially smaller than that of p. Let Enc and
Dec denote the encryption and decryption functions for a symmetric-key
encryption scheme such as Triple-DES, and let H be a hash function. Party
ˆ A encrypts an email m for ˆ B as follows:
(1) Obtain an authentic copy of ˆ B’s static public key B = gb.
(2) Select an ephemeral private key x ∈R [1,q − 1] and compute the
ephemeral public key X = gx and the session key K = H(σ) where
σ = Bx = gbx.
(3) Select at random a content-encryption key k for the symmetric-key
encryption scheme.
(4) Compute a 64-bit checksum v for k, and compute c1 = EncK(k  v).1
(5) Compute c2 = Enck(m).
(6) Send X, c1, c2 to ˆ B.
Upon receiving (X,c1,c2), party ˆ B computes K = H(Xb), decrypts c1, and
veriﬁes that the checksum for the recovered key k is correct. If so, then ˆ B
decrypts c2 to obtain m.
The S/MIME standards allow a party ˆ A to reuse an ephemeral key pair
(x,X) for an unspeciﬁed period of time. For example, [21, Section 2.3]
(see also [10, Section 4.1.1]) advises that some additional data, such as a
counter, be appended to σ prior to hashing to ensure that a diﬀerent session
key is generated even if the ephemeral key is being reused: “If, however, the
same ephemeral sender key is used for multiple messages (e.g. it is cached
as a performance optimization) then a separate partyAInfo MUST be used
for each message.” However, while [21] recommends that the recipient ˆ B
validate the received public key X in order to protect against small-subgroup
attacks that aim to learn its static private key b, there is no requirement
that the sender ˆ A validate the recipient’s static public key B. Section 2.1
of [24] explains that this protection is not necessary because a dishonest
party ˆ B who learns x via a small-subgroup attack isn’t able to mount any
1More precisely, the checksum v consists of the 64 most signiﬁcant bits of SHA-1(k),
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interesting attacks because “the key is ephemeral and only associated with
a message that the recipient can already decrypt...”
Our observation is that interesting small-subgroup attacks can be mounted
in the situation where ˆ A reuses (x,X) to encrypt diﬀerent messages to more
than one user. A dishonest party ˆ B chooses its static public key B = γ to be
an element of small order t in Z∗
p. Upon receiving (X,c1,c2), ˆ B iteratively
computes K′ = H(γc) and decrypts c1 using K′ for c = 0,1,2,... until he
obtains a valid checksum. He then learns that c = x mod t, and can repeat
this procedure for pairwise relatively prime t to recover x. Hereafter, ˆ B is
able to decrypt messages that ˆ A encrypts using x for other (honest) parties.
As mentioned in Section 2.1 such attacks can be thwarted by validating
static public keys, or by selecting DSA parameters p, q so that (p − 1)/q
does not have any small prime factors.
4. HMQV
HMQV [14, 15] is an authenticated Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement proto-
col. In this section, we consider the version of the HMQV protocol that has
been proposed for standardization by P1363 [16].
Let G =  g  be a DSA subgroup, i.e., G is a subgroup of order q of
G′ = Z∗
p, where the bitlength of q is substantially smaller than that of
p. Let H be a hash function, and let H be an l-bit hash function where
l = (⌊log2 q⌋ + 1)/2. Let A = ga and B = gb denote the static public keys
of parties ˆ A and ˆ B respectively.
The HMQV protocol is the following:
(1) The initiator ˆ A selects an ephemeral public key X = gx and sends
A and X to ˆ B.
(2) Upon receiving (A,X), ˆ B does the following:
(a) Verify that A,X ∈ G′ and A,X  = 1.
(b) Select an ephemeral public key Y = gy.
(c) Compute d = H(X, ˆ B), e = H(Y, ˆ A), and r = y + eb mod q.
(d) Compute σ = (XAd)r and K = H(σ).
(e) Send B and Y to ˆ A.
(3) Upon receiving (B,Y ), ˆ A does the following:
(a) Verify that B,Y ∈ G′ and B,Y  = 1.
(b) Compute d = H(X, ˆ B), e = H(Y, ˆ A), and s = x + da mod q.
(c) Compute σ = (Y Be)s and K = H(σ).
If all checks pass, then ˆ A and ˆ B share the session key K = H(σ) where
σ = gsr = g(x+da)(y+eb).
HMQV has been proven secure in the Canetti-Krawczyk model for key
exchange [7] under the assumptions that H and H are random functions,
and the computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem in G is intractable [14, 15].
The security proof assumes that ephemeral keys are used only once, and
that ephemeral private keys are securely destroyed after they have been
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warnings) for an implementer to allow for the reuse of ephemeral public keys
in order to improve performance. We next show that if party ˆ A decides to
reuse an ephemeral key pair (x,X), then party ˆ B may be able to mount a
devastating attack — one that reveals ˆ A’s static private key a.
Our attack assumes that (p − 1)/q has several small (e.g. less than 240)
pairwise relatively prime factors whose product is greater than q; let t be
one such factor. The attacker ˆ B obtains a certiﬁcate for his (valid) static
public key B = gb. Upon receiving (A,X) from ˆ A, the attacker selects an
ephemeral public key Y ∈ G′ of order t, and sends (B,Y ) to ˆ A. The public
keys B and Y satisfy the checks in step 3(a), so ˆ A computes σ = (Y Be)s
and K = H(σ) where s = x + da mod q, d = H(X, ˆ B), and e = H(Y, ˆ A).
Suppose now that ˆ A sends ˆ B an authenticated message (m,T = MACK(m)).
Note that
σ = (Y Be)s = Y sBes = Y s(gs)be = Y s(XAd)be.
Hence ˆ B iteratively computes K′ = H(Y c(XAd)be) and T′ = MACK′(m) for
c = 0,1,2,... until T′ = T in which case c = s mod t. After repeating this
procedure for several pairwise relatively prime orders t, ˆ B can determine s
by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Party ˆ B now repeats the attack using a diﬀerent identiﬁer ˆ B′ (or perhaps
by colluding with a third party ˆ C). Consequently ˆ B learns s′ = x+d′a mod
q, where d′ = H(X, ˆ B′). Since d′  = d with very high probability, ˆ B can then
compute a = (s − s′)(d − d′)−1 mod q.
Our attack is possible because ˆ A is not required to validate public keys.
Omission of validation is intentional in HMQV in order to improve perfor-
mance — the only checks required on B and Y are that they belong to
G′ \ {1}. However, we emphasize that the attack cannot be mounted on
the version of HMQV as described in [16], since that version of the protocol
assumes that ephemeral public keys are never reused. Rather, the attack
highlights the danger of reusing ephemeral public keys in a key agreement
protocol for which the security analysis assumed that ephemeral public keys
are never reused.
5. Concluding remarks
As mentioned in Section 1, the IKEv2 protocol [12] allows for the reuse
of ephemeral private keys. However, the protocol is immune to the small-
subgroup attack described in Section 3 because IKEv2 requires the use of safe
prime groups [22]. More recently, elliptic curve groups have been proposed
for IKE and IKEv2 [8, 6]. To prevent invalid-curve attacks analogous to
the small-subgroup attack described in Section 3, a sender who reuses an
ephemeral key pair to encrypt diﬀerent messages for more than one party
should validate the recipients’ static public keys.
The recent NIST SP 800-56A [23] standard for key agreement explicitly
disallows the reuse of ephemeral keys with one exception — a sender may
reuse an ephemeral key if the resulting session key is used to transport theON REUSING EPHEMERAL KEYS 7
same keying material, and if all these transactions occur “simultaneously”
(or within a short period of time). Since SP 800-56A mandates that all
public keys be validated, this reuse of ephemeral public keys appears to be
sound. It would be useful exercise to capture the reuse of ephemeral keys in
the Canetti-Krawczyk security model (as outlined in [1]) and formally verify
the belief that reusing ephemeral keys as allowed in SP 800-56A does not
introduce any security weaknesses.
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